Twenty years ago the notion of 'sustainable development' was introduced into the political agenda by the World Commission on Environment and Development through its report (WCED, 1987) , also called the Brundtland Report. The Report does not give a precise definition of 'sustainable development'. The quotation that is usually taken as a point of departure is the following: "Sustainable development is a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987, p. 43) . The Brundtland Report looks at sustainability both as a requirement for intragenerational justice and as a requirement for inter generational justice.
In the contributions included in this book I (and my co-authors) limit the discussion by considering sustainability to be a requirement for inter generational justice.
The included articles present models where an infinite number of generations follows in sequence, and where distributional issues within each generation are not explicitly considered. In all but one chapter, population is assumed to be constant. In such a context sustainability requires that we, as the current generation, not use more than our fair share of the resource base. More precisely, we should manage the resource base such that the wellbeing that we ensure ourselves can potentially be shared by all future generations.
The notion 'wellbeing' includes everything that influences the situation in which people live. Hence, it includes much more than material consumption. It is intended to capture the importance of health, culture, and nature. There are two important restrictions, though: Wellbeing does not include the welfare that people derive from their children's consumption. Likewise, only nature's instrumental value (i.e. recognized value to humans) is included in the wellbeing, not its intrinsic value (i.e. value in its own right regardless of human experience); i.e., an anthropocentric perspective is taken. The general rationale behind these restrictions is that there is an argument to be made in favor of distinguishing the concept of justice applied in a society from the forces that are instrumental in attaining it. In the present context this means that it may be desirable to separate the definition of sustainability from the forces that can motivate our generation to act in accordance with the requirement of sustainability.
To approach a formal sustainability definition, I follow Pezzey (1997, p. 451) in saying that development is sustained if the stream of wellbeing is non-decreasing. Using this term we can then define the concept of sustainable development as follows:
Definition 1 A generation's management of the resource base at some point in time is sustainable if it constitutes the first part of a feasible sustained development. A stream of wellbeing develops in a sustainable manner if each generation's management of the resource base is sustainable.
The idea of defining sustainability in this way corresponds closely to what is usually meant by sustainability, which "basically gets at the issue of whether or not future generations will be at least as well off as the present generation" (Krautkraemer, 1998 (Krautkraemer, , p. 2091 . This is not the place to present a survey of the abundance of sustainability definitions; it suffices to stay that the above definition is closely related to the definition of sustainability proposed by Pezzey (1997) . Note that sustainability in the sense of Definition 1 does not preclude that a generation makes a large sacrifice to the benefit of future generations, so that its own wellbeing is lower than that of its predecessor. Hence, sustainable development is a wider concept than sustained development: While sustained development implies sustainable development, the converse implication does not hold.
Economic theories of natural and environmental resources usually seek to answer the following question: How can an efficient management of natural and environmental resources be achieved? The objective is to get the real economy to imitate a perfect market economy through internalizing external effects and to promote economic efficiency through regulating the use of natural and environmental resources when such internalization is not feasible. Traditionally, many economists have held the view that, in a perfect market economy, posterity will be made better off due to accumulation of manmade capital (including accumulation of knowledge). To the extent that the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of environmental resources have been explicitly taken into account, these economists have claimed that, due to rising resource prices and technological progress, new reserves will be added to existing resources and substitutes to these resources will be made available. A classic reference for this point of view is Barnett and Morse (1963) (see also Nordhaus, 1974) .
However, in general, this view cannot be defended. At any time the present generation determines how the resource base is being managed. Given our technological capacities, it is possible to exploit the resource base to our own advantage-at the expense of the wellbeing of future generations. That economic efficiency does not necessarily lead to intergenerational fairness was forcefully argued by Talbot Page (1977) in his book Conservation and Economic Efficiency. He illustrated the issue by the following analogy: If someone suggested that the ocean fisheries in the Pacific should be regulated by giving full rights to the entire resource stock to Japan for one year, to the United States for the next, to Russia for the third year, and so forth, it would be natural to claim that the country that came first would exploit the resources to too large an extent. This skepticism would be especially great if the harvest methods were technologically advanced. Still, if we abstract from the fact that generations overlap, this is the way a perfect market economy (without market failure of any kind) allocates natural and environmental resources between the generations: Future generations' wellbeing depends on the altruism that we extend to them as well as our limited capacity to exploit stocks of natural and environmental resources to our own advantage.
This leads to the following conclusions:
• Generational conflicts will not necessarily be solved in a perfect market economy. Distributional problems arise because the present generation through its capital and resource management policy determines the endowment of future generations.
• A requirement for sustainability, if binding, is a requirement for a more fair intergenerational distribution. It is not a requirement for an efficient management of natural and environmental resources. Page (1977) contains another analogy-of a sailing ship-which nicely illustrates this distinction: Sustainability corresponds to setting the rudder according to the destination, while efficiency corresponds to balancing the sails according to the wind.
The two issues are related: How the rudder is set influences how the sails will have to be balanced. However, if we care about where we will end up, it is not sufficient to concentrate all attention on how the sails are balanced.
In the collection of articles included in this book, I (and my co-authors) subject sustainable development to economic analysis by posing three questions.
(1) Justifying sustainability: From a normative perspective, why is it desirable for our generation to contribute to the implementation of sustainable develop- This book consists of three parts corresponding to the three questions posed above; each part consisting of 6 articles. In the following three sections of the introduction I give a guide to each part. I also provide an up-to-date but selective survey of relevant literature and their relation to the included articles.
Justifying sustainability
Generations have conflicting interests in the management of the resource base: If the current generation increases its own wellbeing by exploiting natural resources and degrading the quality of the natural environment, without making sufficient compensating investments in manmade capital, then the interests of future generations are undermined.
Can social choice theory guide us in the normative question on how such an intergenerational conflict should be resolved if all generations gathered behind a veil of ignorance (Vickrey, 1945; Harsanyi, 1953; Rawls, 1971) , not knowing in what sequence they would be appear? What kind of criterion for intergenerational justice would we recommend if we did not know to what generation we belonged and considered intergenerational distribution from an anonymous perspective? Would we in such a hypothetical situation argue for sustainable development, thus giving this concept a normative foundation?
When seeking a normative foundation for sustainability, one must impose some self-evident condition (or axiom) ruling out present behavior that leads to inequitable consequences for future generations. A commonly suggested equity condition is Weak Anonymity (WA). This condition ensures equal treatment of all generations by requiring that a permutation of the wellbeing of two (or a finite number of) generations not change the social evaluation of the stream. In the intergenerational context WA implies that it is not justifiable to discriminate against a generation only because it appears at a later stage on the time axis.
However, equal treatment can be achieved by treating all generations equally poorly. Therefore, one must also impose some condition that leads to efficiency, thus ruling out such wasteful policies. A commonly suggested efficiency condition is Strong Pareto (SP). This condition ensures sensitivity to interests of any one generation by requiring that a stream of wellbeing is socially preferred to another if it at least one generation is better off and no generation is worse off.
When applied to a reflexive and transitive binary relation, the combination of WA and SP is often referred to as the Suppes-Sen grading principle (Suppes, 1966; Sen, 1970) .
In Chapter 3 (which reproduces ), Wolfgang Buchholz, Bertil Tungodden and I show that the Suppes-Sen grading principle rules out any unsustainable development if the technology is productive. The intuition is simple: Suppose one generation's wellbeing is higher than the next. If the excess wellbeing of the first generation were shifted to the second, then by WA the resulting stream would be equally good in social evaluation. However, since the technology is productive, such an investment of the excess wellbeing of the first generation will actually have a positive net return, meaning that the second generation will end up with a higher wellbeing than what the first generation had in the original situation. Hence, by SP, there exists a feasible transfer from one generation to the next that leads to a socially preferred stream whenever the first generation has a higher wellbeing than the second. This means that only efficient and non-decreasing streams of well-being can be admissible in social evaluation under WA and SP. Such streams correspond to sustained-and hence, sustainable-development.
Even after ruling out streams that are not efficient and non-decreasing, the following problem remains: How to resolve intergenerational conflicts that go beyond the sustainability question? In Chapter 4 (which reproduces Asheim and Tungodden, 2004) , Bertil Tungodden and I address this problem by imposing further conditions on the social evaluations of wellbeing streams. We first impose (two versions of) a preference continuity axiom that establishes a link to the standard finite setting of distributive justice, by transforming the comparison of any two infinite streams to an infinite number of comparisons of streams each containing a finite number of generations. We may then supplement WA and SP with well-known equity conditions from the traditional literature on distributive justice.
One such condition is Hammond Equity, giving absolute priority to generation i if generation i is worse off than generation j, in comparisons between two streams where all generations but i and j have the same wellbeing. When added to our other conditions, this results in lexicographic maximin (or 'leximin' ) extended by an overtaking procedure to an infinite number of generations. Leximin gives absolute priority to the worst-off generation, but takes in a lexicographic manner into account the wellbeing of better-off generations to resolve ties between alternatives. Under this criterion of intergenerational justice an efficient and completely egalitarian stream is the unique optimum if such a stream exists.
Another condition applied in the traditional literature is 2-Generational Unit Comparability, which also considers comparisons between two streams where all generations but i and j have the same wellbeing. It requires that there there be a cardinal scale of instantaneous utility, along which wellbeing is measured, so that social evaluation not change if there is a constant addition to the wellbeing of generation i in both alternatives and a (possibly different) constant addition to the wellbeing of generation j in both alternatives. When included, this leads to undiscounted utilitarianism extended by an overtaking procedure to an infinite number of generations.
Undiscounted utilitarianism maximizes the sum of wellbeing and entails that any admissible stream is efficient and increasing in productive technologies. 1 Hence, both leximin and undiscounted utilitarianism satisfy WA as a condition for equal treatment, while a commonly used criterion like discounted utilitarianism does not. It has been suggested (see Asheim and Buchholz, 2003, p. 407, for references) that the application of undiscounted utilitarianism imposes unacceptable demands on the present generations, by requiring it to implement a very high saving rate in productive economies. This in turn is used as an ethical justification for discounting, as it protects the present generation from the excessive saving that seems to be implied when future wellbeing is not discounted.
In Chapter 5 (which reproduces Wolfgang Buch-holz and I question this justification of discounting by showing that undiscounted utilitarianism has sufficient malleability within important classes of technologies.
Consider any efficient and non-decreasing stream of wellbeing. Then there exists some cardinal scale of instantaneous utility, along which wellbeing is measured, so that this stream is the unique optimum according to undiscounted utilitarianism when this utility scale is used. 2 However, if we seek to resolve the intergenerational conflicts that go beyond the sustainability question, then this may not be an entirely attractive conclusion:
Even if we add to the Suppes-Sen principle conditions sufficient to characterize some version of undiscounted utilitarianism, we need not limit the kinds of sustainable development that may be deemed as an acceptable social choice.
The so-called Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS) model of capital accumulation and resource depletion Heal, 1974, 1979; Solow, 1974 ) is a useful testing ground for different criteria for intergenerational justice.
• Even under assumptions that ensure that non-decreasing streams are feasible, discounted utilitarianism forces wellbeing towards a zero consumption level eventually, independently of how small the positive discount rate is. The reason is that the capital productivity of the economy approaches zero as an increasing stock of reproducible capital substitutes for dwindling resource input. Hence, discounted utilitarianism seems not to respect the interests of the future generations in this model.
• Undiscounted utilitarianism, on the other hand, leads to unbounded growth if the function that maps wellbeing into instantaneous utility is strictly increasing (cf. footnote 2), leading to unacceptable inequality: Why should we save for the benefit of descendants infinitely better off than ourselves?
• Finally, leximin leads to a constant consumption stream, implying that wellbeing at any point at time is at the maximal level compatible with sustainable for their children, why should they not be allowed to save on their behalf?
In Chapter 6 (which reproduces Asheim, 1988) I analyze the DHS model and ask whether there are criteria for intergenerational justice which (i) protect the distant generations against the grave consequences of discounting, (ii) do not lead to unacceptable inequalities, and (iii) do not waste the possibilities for development.
Answers to this question can be provided by assuming that each generation's dynamic welfare-according to its subjective preferences-is a convex combination of its own wellbeing (measured along some cardinal scale of instantaneous utility) and the dynamic welfare of its children. The term 'subjective preferences' is meant to capture 'selfish' altruism, which motivates a generation to contribute to the welfare of its children because it leads to increased welfare for the contributor. Note that the subjective preferences are non-paternalistic (in the terminology of Ray, 1987) since each generation respects the subjective preferences of its children, and thereby, takes into account the wellbeing of all future generations. If each generation manages the resource base in order to maximize its dynamic welfare, then the resulting stream corresponds to a discounted utilitarian optimum. Hence, in the DHS model, this leads to unacceptable outcomes for future generations.
However, if the criterion of intergenerational justice maximizes the dynamic welfare of the generation that according to its subjective preferences is worst off, thenas I show in Chapter 6-this leads to streams where wellbeing grows initially when the economy is highly productive, followed by an eventual phase with constant wellbeing, thereby protecting the distant generations against the grave consequences of discounting. Thus, the possibilities for development are not wasted without leading to unbounded inequalities, while at the same time the economy's resource base is managed in a sustainable manner. This criterion, which is due to Calvo (1978) , includes undiscounted utilitarianism and leximin as special cases since (i) if each generation on the basis of its subjective preferences does not discount the welfare of its children, then the criterion of intergenerational justice is of no importance and we return to undiscounted utilitarianism, while on the other hand (ii) if every generation discounts the welfare of its children heavily, then the criterion leads to a 8 completely egalitarian stream and no development occurs.
In Chapter 7 (which reproduces Asheim, 1991) I first give a justification of sustainability, as an alternative to the one presented in Chapter 3. 3 I postulate that one stream is better than another if it has both less inequality (in terms of Lorenz domination) and a larger sum of wellbeing (measured along some cardinal scale of instantaneous utility). This amounts to a seemingly weak ethical restriction:
A feasible development is excluded if there exists another feasible development that increases the total sum to be shared between the generations, and simultaneously, shares it in a more egalitarian way. I show that a stream of wellbeing must be nondecreasing in order to be an admissible social choice under this ethical restriction. I then consider the consequences in the DHS model of each generation managing the resource base in order to maximize its dynamic welfare, subject to the constraint that wellbeing is non-decreasing. This turns out to produce the same kinds of streams as in Chapter 6, where wellbeing grows initially when the economy is highly productive, followed by an eventual phase with constant wellbeing. 
Characterizing sustainability
Human economic activity leads to the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of environmental resources. Sustainable development requires that manmade capital (both real and human) be accumulated in order to make up for the decreased availability of natural capital. Hartwick's (1977) rule is a well-known characterization result for sustainable development of a certain kind, namely development where wellbeing is held constant, meaning that at all times wellbeing is held at the maximum level consistent with sustainability. The rule assumes constant population and a stationary technology and gives the following characterization: In a perfect market economy, wellbeing is held constant indefinitely if the depletion of natural capital at any time corresponds 3 The justification of sustainability provided in Chapter 7 requires that wellbeing is measured along a cardinal scale of instantaneous utility and that both levels of and differences in such instantaneous utility are comparable between different generations. For the justification of sustainability provided in Chapter 3, on the other hand, it is sufficient that wellbeing is measured along an ordinal scale, and that levels of wellbeing are comparable between different generations.
in market value to the accumulation of manmade capital, i.e., the market value of net investments is equal to zero.
Note that Hartwick's rule does not entail that the total value of the capital stocks is constant along a path where wellbeing is held constant. This would be the case under the assumption of a constant interest rate. However, constant wellbeing and a constant interest rate may be inconsistent in the sense that they cannot both be realized. This is indeed the case in the DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion, where the decreasing capital productivity (as an increasing stock of reproducible capital substitutes for dwindling resource input) along the egalitarian stream corresponds to a decreasing interest rate. If the interest rate decreases, then the capital gains will be positive. In this case, constant wellbeing corresponds to an increasing total value of the capital stocks. In Chapter 10 (which reproduces Asheim, 1996) I explore the relation between capital gains and the interest rate along an egalitarian path.
Hartwick's rule holds both for an open (national) and a closed (global) economy.
However, particular problems arise when applying Hartwick's rule for sustainability in an open economy: The technology must then include the gains from trade (see Svensson, 1986) . This means that the assumption of a stationary technology would necessitate that the relative international prices are constant. However, from Hotelling's (1931) rule it follows that from a resource-rich economy's point of view, the terms-of-trade facing future generations will be more favorable than the one facing the present generation. This implies that a part of the capital gains on the unexploited stocks of natural resources can be consumed at the present time without conflicting with the sustainability requirement, thus lowering the required compensating investments. Hence, sustainability for all countries require resource-rich economies to invest less that their own resource rents, and resource-poor economies to invest more. In Chapter 9 (which reproduces Asheim, 1986) Formally, the main result of Chapter 11 states that if a constant wellbeing stream maximizes the sum of discounted wellbeing for some path of discount factors supporting the wellbeing stream, then the value of net investments is equal to zero at all times. In a critique of our work, Cairns and Yang (2000) argue that, in the context of streams where wellbeing is held at the maximum level consistent with sustainability, discounting "is contrived and inconsistent with the motivation of sustainability analysis". They thus suggest that in the DHS model-which is the basic model in which Hartwick's rule for sustainability was originally derived-falls outside the realm for the main result in Chapter 11.
Chapter 12 (which is a corrected version of Withagen et al., 2003a) 5 was originally written as a response to the critique presented by Cairns and Yang (2000) .
In this paper, Cees Withagen, Wolfgang Buchholz and I supplement the analysis of Chapter 11 by showing that any stream in the DHS model having the property that the wellbeing of the worst-off generation is maximized satisfies the following: It has constant consumption and maximizes the sum of discounted consumption for some path of supporting discount factors. This means that the premise of our general result on the converse of Hartwick's rule is satisfied in the case of the DHS model. (2000) is based on a misunderstanding that stems from confounding discounted utilitarianism as a primary ethical objective with having supporting discount factors in a model where intergenerational equity is the objective. In Chapter 13 (which reproduces Withagen et al., 2003b ) Cees Withagen, Wolfgang Buchholz and I clarify our approach further and relate it to the concept of separating hyperplanes. Thus, we connect the characterization of sustainability with the basic results of modern microeconomic theory, as originating with Arrow (1951) , Debreu (1951) and Arrow and Debreu (1951) in a general setting, and with Malinvaud (1953) in the setting of dynamic infinite-horizon economies.
The view presented by Cairns and Yang
Chapters 9-13 are introduced by Chapter 8 which reproduces . In this chapter, Wolfgang Buchholz, Cees Withagen and I shed light on Hartwick's rule, provide semantic clarifications, and investigates the implications and relevance of this rule.
Indicating sustainability
The question which is posed in part III of this book-"how can we tell whether development is in fact sustainable"-is often associated with a question posed by Hicks (1946) in his book Value and Capital : What is the maximum that a population of an economy can consume in a given period and still be as well off at the end of the period as it was in the beginning? (cf. Hicks, 1946, p. 172) . In an economy with constant population and a stationary technology, this question can easily be answered if there is only one aggregate capital good: Wellbeing does not exceed the sustainable level if and only if the stock of the aggregate capital good is not reduced.
It is, however, a complicated task to answer this question in an economy with heterogeneous capital. The reason is that if human economic activity depletes the stocks of natural capital, then it is necessary to determine how much accumulation of manmade capital is required to make up for the depletion. How can relative prices be found that 'correctly' value the different kinds of capital? It is a natural point of departure to investigate whether market prices-under the assumption of a perfect market economy with constant population and a stationary technology-can be used to determine the 'correct' relative price between natural and manmade capital: Does it hold that wellbeing does not exceed the maximum sustainable level if the market value of net investments is nonnegative, i.e., if the accumulation of manmade capital at least compensates in market value for the depletion of natural capital? Is a nonnegative market value of net investments sufficient for sustainability? By Hartwick's (1977) rule, wellbeing is constant and at its maximum sustainable level if the market value of net investments is equal to zero at all future times. In the context of a competitive economy, Hartwick's rule states that an intertemporal competitive equilibrium leads to a completely egalitarian path if, at all times, the value of depleted natural capital measured at competitive prices equals the reinvestment in manmade capital. However, Hartwick's rule does not entail that a competitive economy that for the moment measured at competitive prices reinvests depleted natural capital in manmade capital manages its stocks for natural and manmade capital in a sustainable manner. For it is conceivable that such reinvestment is achieved because the competitive prices of natural capital are low. This in turn can be caused by the economy not being managed in a sustainable manner: If future generations are poorer than we are, they will be unable to "bid" highly through the intertemporal competitive equilibrium for the depletable natural capital we manage, leading to low prices of such capital today.
Hence, although Hartwick's rule implies that the economy follows an efficient and egalitarian path if the market value of net investments is equal to zero at all times, one cannot conclude that if the market value of net investments at some time is equal to zero, then the wellbeing at that time is sustainable. I show this formally in Chapter 15 (which reproduces Asheim, 1994) by means of a counterexample in the context of the DHS model. Thus, since the value of net investments is not a perfect indicator of sustainability even if the vector of net investments takes into account the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of environmental resources, it is likewise not possible to indicate sustainability by comparing the value of consumption with comprehensive (or "green") net national product (where net national product is defined as the sum of the value of consumption and the value of such a comprehensive vector of net investments).
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The reason why this does not hold is that the relative price of manmade capital in terms of natural capital in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium depends on the entire future equilibrium path. Or in the words of Pezzey and Toman (2002) In an economy where wellbeing depends on a single consumption good, this concept of income can be defined as the constant level of consumption with the same present value as the actual future stream of consumption. In Chapter 16 (which reproduces Asheim, 1997 ) I show how comprehensive net national product must then be adjusted for anticipated capital gains and interest rate effects in order to measure this kind of Hicksian income. Unfortunately, this analysis is hard to generalize to the empirically relevant case of multiple consumption goods.
However, the Hicksian question-what is the maximum that a population of an economy can consume in a given period and still be as well off at the end of the period as it was in the beginning-can be interpreted in an alternative manner. One important alternative is to associate "as well off" with the level of dynamic welfare, e.g., of the kind discussed in Section 1 of this chapter, entailing that dynamic welfare corresponds to a discounted utilitarian welfare function. In this case it follows from • even if dynamic welfare does not correspond to a discounted utilitarian welfare function. This is shown by Wolfgang Buchholz and me in Chapter 18 (which reproduces Asheim and Buchholz, 2004) under the provision that dynamic welfare is maximized.
Chapter 18 also applies the DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion to illustrate how a positive value of net investments and an increasing real net national product can be used to indicate welfare improvement when the economy has other objectives than discounted utilitarianism, e.g., objectives which incorporates a concern for sustainability.
In practical applications, a host of different problems makes it hard to use the indicators above for determining whether dynamic welfare is increasing.
The assumption that technology is stationary means that technological progress is captured by capital components that measure accumulated knowledge. The change in these components must be included in the vector of net investments and valued. How restrictive this assumption is, relates closely to a second problem, namely that not all investment flows can be valued given the available price information. This applies not only to accumulated knowledge, but also to stocks of natural and environmental capital. A third problem is related to the fact that our capital and resource management does not have deterministic consequences.
Finally, if we allow for growth in population, then-even if we assume that an aggregate capital good exists-it is inappropriate to require that the per capita capital stock be non-decreasing if the rate of population growth varies over time. If, e.g., the present generation is half as large as all future generations (i.e. population is constant beginning with the next generation), then sustainability does not require that the present generation accumulates the stock of the aggregate capital stock to a size twice as large as the one it inherited. Because this would leave the current generation at a level of per capita wellbeing which is lower than that of later generations. In Chapter 19 (which reproduces Asheim, 2004 ) I discuss the meaning of sustainability and welfare improvement under population growth and present a general analysis of how to indicate welfare improvement with a changing population.
The analysis of Chapters 17-19 shows that a positive value of net investments (appropriately adjusted if technology is not stationary or population is growing) indicates welfare improvement. Returning to the discussion of Chapter 15, we recall that a non-negative value of net investments is not a sufficient condition for sustainability, entailing that increasing dynamic welfare does not ensure that wellbeing is below the sustainable level. However, we have not addressed the question whether it is a necessary condition: Does a decreasing dynamic welfare imply that wellbeing exceeds the sustainable level? Pezzey (2004) demonstrates that this is indeed the case under discounted utilitarianism, thereby showing that the welfare analysis of Chapters 17 and 19 can be used as a one-sided sustainability test.
Chapters 15-19 are introduced by Chapter 14 which reproduces Asheim (2003) .
In this chapter, I emphasize the role that different assumptions play for the various results in welfare and sustainability accounting.
